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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
V. 
KYLE STEVEN BOWER, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
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___________ ) 
NO. 41336 
CANYON COUNTY NO. CR 2012-9274 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
IN SUPPORT OF 
PETITION FOR REVIEW 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Kyle Steven Bower asks the Idaho Supreme Court to review the opinion of the 
Idaho Court of Appeals, 2015, Unpublished Opinion No. 351 (Ct. App. February 13, 
2015) (hereinafter, Opinion). He submits that the Opinion, which affirmed his Judgment 
of Conviction, is in conflict with previous decisions of the Court of Appeals and not likely 
in accord with applicable decisions of the Idaho Supreme Court where the Court of 
Appeals found that Mr. Bower's claim that the district court erred in denying his motion 
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tp sever the c~arges related to two separate victims following after Mr. Bower was 
charged with three sex offenses. 
Statement of the Facts & Course of Proceedings 
Kyle Steven Bower was charged, by superseding indictment, with two counts of 
lewd concluct with a minor under sixteen and one count of sexual abuse of a child under 
sixteen. (R., pp.19-21.) The conduct charged in counts one and three was alleged to 
have occurred against K.B. 1 between 2011 and 2012, when she was between the ages 
of 13 and 14 years old; the conduct charged in count two was alleged to have occurred 
against J.B.2 in 2004, when she was between the ages of 10 and 11 years old. 
(R., p.20.) Count one, involving K.B., alleged "manual to genital and/or genital to genital 
contact," while count two, involving J.B. alleged "manual to genital contact." (R., p.20.) 
Count three, involving K.B., alleged "manual to breast contact." (R., p.20.) 
Mr. Bower filed a Motion to Sever count two from counts one and three, asserting 
that the facts and circumstances are "separate and apart from each other," the victims 
are different, the incidents were alleged to have occurred years apart, and "[h]aving 
these counts together will highly prejudice" Mr. Bower. (R., p.39.) The district court 
denied the Motion to Sever, concluding that "Defendant has failed to make a prima facie 
showing that any of the factors identified by the Idaho appellate courts as justifying 
severance are present in this case." (R., p.53.) 
1 K.B. is the biological daughter of Mr. Bower. (Tr., p.277, Ls.3-13.) 
2 J.B. considered Mr. Bower to be her main father figure, as her biological father was 
not involved in her early life, and although they never married, Mr. Bower and her 
mother spent nine years together. (Tr., p.485, L.19 - p.487, L.21.) 
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Following a jury trial, Mr. Bower was found guilty of all three counts. (Tr., p. 750, 
L.6 - p.751, L.4.) Mr. Bower filed a timely Notice of Appeal. (R., p.295.) On appeal, 
Mr. Bower contended the district court erred in denying his motion to sever where it 
mistakenly considered the motion as one made under Idaho Criminal Rule 14, which it 
is in the district court's discretion to grant or deny, rather than Idaho Criminal Rule 8, 
which involves a legal determination of the propriety of joinder. (Appellant's Brief, pp.2-
11.) The Idaho Court of Appeals found that Mr. Bower failed to present the motion to 
sever under I.C.R. 8, but rather that it was brought pursuant to I.C.R. 14 in the district 
court. (Opinion, pp.4-7.) As a result, the Court of Appeals concluded that the issue was 
not preserved for appellate review and affirmed the district court's order denying the 
motion to sever under I.C.R. 14 (Opinion, pp.6-7.) 
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ISSUE 
Is the Idaho Court of Appeals' Opinion affirming Mr. Bower's Judgment of Conviction not 
likely in accord with applicable decisions of the Idaho Supreme Court and in conflict with 
previous decisions of the Idaho Court of Appeals? 
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ARGUMENT 
The Idaho Court Of Appeals' Opinion Affirmin l Mr. Bower's Judgment Of Conviction Is 
Not Likely In Accord With Applicable Decisions Of The Idaho Supreme Court And Is In 
Conflict With Previous Decisions Of The Idaho Court Of Appeals 
A. Introduction 
Mr. Bower asserts that the district court committed legal error when it denied his 
motion to sever count two from counts one and three because they were improperly 
joined. In denying the motion, the district court considered the motion as one made 
under Idaho Criminal Rule 14, which it is in the district court's discretion to grant or 
deny, rather than Idaho Criminal Rule 8, which involves a legal determination of the 
propriety of joinder. 
On appeal, Mr. Bower contends that the district court should have considered his 
motion to sever pursuant to I.C.R. 8. The Idaho Court of Appeals held that Mr. Bower's 
argument under !.C.R. 8 was not preserved for appellate review. For the reasons stated 
below, Mr. Bower asserts his motion to sever pursuant to !.C.R. 8 is properly before the 
appellate court and the district court erred in denying his motion. 
B. The Idaho Court Of Appeals' Opinion Affirming Mr. Bower's Judgment Of 
Conviction Is Not Likely In Accord With Applicable Decisions Of The Idaho 
Supreme Court And Is In Conflict With Previous Decisions Of The Idaho Court Of 
Appeals 
The Idaho Appellate Rules provide that petitions for review may be granted only 
"when there are special and important reasons" for doing so, but, ultimately, the 
decision of whether to grant a given petition lies within the sound discretion of the 
Supreme Court. I.A. R. 118(b ). This exercise of discretion is not completely unfettered 
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though. Rule 11 S(b) lists five factors which must serve as the starting point in 
evaluating any petition for review: 
1) Whether the Court of Appeals has decided an issue of first impression; 
2) Whether the Court of Appeals' decision is inconsistent with precedent from 
the Idaho Supreme Court or the United States Supreme Court; 
3) Whether the Court of Appeals' decision is inconsistent with its own prior 
decisions; 
4) Whether the Court of Appeals' actions are so unusual as to call for the 
Supreme Courts' exercise of its supervisory authority; and 
5) Whether a majority of the Court of Appeals has certified that further 
appellate review is desirable. 
I.A.R. 118(b). 
As is set forth in detail below, the Court of Appeals' Opinion in this case is not 
likely in accord with applicable decisions of the Idaho Supreme Court and likely in 
conflict with decisions of the Idaho Court of Appeals where the Court of Appeals found 
that Mr. Bower's trial attorney filed his motion to sever under I.C.R. 14 and not I.C.R. 8, 
and therefore, Mr. Bower's claim under I.C.R. 8 was not preserved for appellate review. 
See State v. Sheahan, 139 Idaho 267, 277-278 (2003) (recognizing that an issue is 
preserved for appellate review where the claim raised on appeal is "substantially the 
same" or sufficiently overlaps with the issue raised in the trial court.); State v. Voss, 152 
Idaho 148 (Ct. App. 2011) (same). 
C. If This Court Grants Mr. Bower's Petition For Review, He Asserts That The Court 
Of Appeals Erred In Determining That Mr. Bower's Motion To Sever Two 
Charges Was Not Preserved For Review 
On appeal, Mr. Bower argued that "the district court committed legal error when it 
denied his motion to sever count two from counts one and three because they were 
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improperly joined. In denying the motion, the district court mistakenly considered the 
motion as one made under Idaho Criminal Rule 14, which it is in the district court's 
discretion to grant or deny, rather than Idaho Criminal Rule 8, which involves a legal 
determination of the propriety of joinder." (Appellant's Brief, p.2.) Mr. Bower argued 
that if the district court had reviewed the motion to sever under I.C.R. 8, his conviction 
would have been reverse and case remanded back for separate, new trials. 
(Appellant's Brief, pp.4-11.) The Idaho Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's 
order denying Mr. Bower's motion to sever. (Opinion, p.1.) The Court of Appeals 
concluded that Mr. Bower had not preserved his claim that his motion to sever pursuant 
to I.C.R. 8 should have been granted for appellate review because that claim was not 
raised in the district court. (Opinion, pp.4-7.) Mr. Bower asserts that the district court 
erred in failing to address this merits of his claim on appeal. 
As a general rule, issues not raised in the lower court may not be considered for 
the first time on appeal. State v. Fodge, 121 Idaho 192, 195 (1992). "Where a party 
appeals the decision of an intermediate appellate court, the appellant may not raise 
issues that are different from issues presented to the intermediate appellate court." 
State v. Voss, 152 Idaho 148, 150 Ct. App. 2011) (citing State v. Sheahan, 139 Idaho 
267, 275 (2003)). "An issue is different if it is not substantially same or does not 
sufficiently overlap with an issue before the trial court." Id. 
Mr. Bower asserts that the Idaho Court of Appeals erred in failing to consider his 
claim that his motion to sever pursuant to I.C.R. 8(a) should have been granted 
because the issues raised in his motion to sever in the trial court are substantially the 
same and sufficiently overlap with the claims Mr. Bower raised on direct appeal. 
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Idaho Criminal Rule 8(a) provides: 
Two (2) or more offenses may be charged on the same complaint, 
indictment or information and a separate count for each offense if the 
offenses charged, whether felonies or misdemeanors or both, are based 
on the same act or transaction or on two (2) or more acts or transactions 
connected together or constituting parts of a common scheme or plan. 
I.C.R. 8(a). Claims brought under I.C.R. 8(a) are subject to free review by the Court. 
State v. Field, 144 Idaho 559, 565 (2007) ("Whether a court improperly joined offenses 
pursuant to I.C.R. 8 is a question of law, over which this Court exercises free review.") 
(citations omitted). Contrarily, "[p]arties properly joined under I.C.R. 8(b) may be 
severed under !.C.R. 14 if it appears that joint trial would be prejudicial, and the 
defendant has the burden of showing such prejudice." State v. Caudill, 109 Idaho 222, 
226 (1985). Motions to sever brought pursuant to I.C.R. 14 are subjected to an abuse is 
discretion standard. 
In his motion to sever, Mr. Bower sought to sever count two from counts one and 
three, asserting that the facts and circumstances are "separate and apart from each 
other," the victims are different, the incidents were alleged to have occurred years apart, 
and "[h]aving these counts together will highly prejudice" Mr. Bower. (R., p.39.) 
Mr. Bower acknowledges that of the four reasons for the motion to sever, one of those 
reasons is not subject to Rule 8 analysis, namely, "Having these counts together will 
highly prejudice defendant." Rather, the determination of prejudices is relevant to the 
review of a motion to sever brought under I.C.R. 14. However, the other three reasons 
for granting the motion to sever are relevant to a determination on whether to grant a 
motion to sever pursuant to I.C.R. 8(a), which looks to whether the offenses charged, 
"whether felonies or misdemeanors or both, are based on the same act or transaction or 
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on two (2) or more acts or transactions connected together or constituting parts of a 
common scheme or plan." See I.C.R. 8(a). Moreover, during the hearing on the motion 
to sever, the State cited directly cited to I.C.R. 8(a), arguing, 
Obviously, Idaho Criminal Rule 8 provides for the State to join multiple 
offenses in one indictment. There are - - according to Idaho Rule 8, there 
are a couple of different situations that must be present in order to meet 
that criteria. Specifically, that being that they arise from the same act or 
transactions, they're connected together, or they constitute part of a 
common scheme or plan 
It's the State's position in this case that, in fact, this constitutes part 
of a common scheme or plan and hence the reason that they were joined 
together. 
(Tr., p.2, L.16 p.3, L.2.) Then, in response, defense counsel for Mr. Bower 
distinguished the cases cited by the State. (Tr., p.8, L.10 -- p.9, L.9.) 
Accordingly, based on the foregoing, it is apparent that Mr. Bower's motion to 
sever pursuant to I.C.R. 8(a) was raised in the district court and preserved for appellate 
review. Alternatively, at the very least, there is substantial overlap between arguments 
made in support of I.C.R. 8 and I.C.R. 14 such that this Court should review the merits 
of Mr. Bower's I.C.R. 8 motion to sever. 
D. If This Court Grants Mr. Bower's Petition For Review1 He Asserts District Court 
Erred When It Denied Mr. Bower's Motion To Sever Because The Conduct 
Alleged In Count Two Was Not Based On The Same Act Or Transaction Or Part 
Of A "Common Scheme Or Plan" To Commit The Conduct Alleged In Counts 
One And Three 
In Field, this Court explained, "Cases discussing common plans have focused on 
whether the offenses were one continuing action or whether the offenses have sufficient 
common elements including the type of sexual abuse, the circumstances under which 
the abuse occurred, and the age of the victims." Field, 144 Idaho at 565. The 
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defendant in Field was charged with having manual-to-genital contact with a seven year 
o!d girl in 2003, and having rubbed the buttocks of a 17 year old girl in 2001. Id. at 566. 
Before the district court, the State argued that joinder was appropriate because "the 
offenses constitute a common scheme because Field asked the individual girls to come 
near him, began to 'innocently' touch them and then put his hand down their pants." Id. 
On appeal, the State added an additional reason that joinder was appropriate: "that 
Field had a plan to take advantage of underage girls that come into his home to babysit 
or be babysat." Id. 
In rejecting the State's argument and finding joinder improper under Rule 8, this 
Court reasoned, "the incidents occurred at different times, under different 
circumstances, and involved different parties with significantly different ages." Id. This 
Court further explained, "These separate acts did not constitute part of a common 
scheme or plan. There is nothing to show that at the time Field committed the offense 
against T.B. he had a plan to also commit an offense against H.P .... [or] against 
someone he would be 'babysitting' two years later." Id. This Court noted that while 
both victims were minors, they "had different ages (one was a young child, the other 
was almost an adult), the type of sexual contact was different (digital vaginal penetration 
and the rubbing of buttocks), and the incidents occurred two years apart," while the 
similarities, "that both girls were only temporarily in the household, that the acts 
occurred in Field's home, and that the abuse began with 'innocent' touching" were 
"insufficient to prove a common scheme or plan." Id. at 566-67. 
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Interpreting the similar Federal Criminal Rule of Procedure 8, 3 the Ninth Circuit 
has explained that its "common scheme or plan" language requires an examination of 
"whether '[c]omission of one of the offenses [ ]either depended upon [ ]or necessarily 
led to the commission of the other; proof of the one act [ ]either constituted [ ]or 
depended upon proof of the other."' United States v. Jawara, 474 F.3d 565, 574 (9th 
Cir. 2006) (quoting United States v. Halper, 590 F.2d 422, 429 (2d Cir. 1978)) (brackets 
in original). 
In State v. Johnson, 148 Idaho 664 (2010), interpreting the term "common 
scheme or plan" in assessing the admissibility of other acts evidence under Rule 404(b) 
in a lewd conduct prosecution, this Court provided guidance as to the meaning and 
scope of the term "common scheme or plan." Johnson was charged with three counts 
of lewd conduct, alleged to have been committed against his daughter when she was 
six to seven years old. Johnson, 148 Idaho at 666. The charges concerned allegations 
that Johnson had engaged the victim in manual-to-genital contact, oral-to-genital 
contact, and attempted sexual intercourse through genital-to-genital contact. Id. Over 
Johnson's objection, the State was allowed to introduce evidence that Johnson "had 
molested his younger sister when she was approximately eight years old and he was 
between fifteen and sixteen," with such abuse consisting mainly of "Johnson exposing 
himself to his sister and requesting that she expose herself to him," with one instance of 
manual-to-genital contact. Id. at 667. 
3 The key difference between Idaho's Rule 8 and the federal version is that the plain 
language of the federal rule is far more liberal, allowing for joinder when the offenses 
"are of the same or similar character" even if they are not based on the same act or 
transaction or part of a common scheme or plan. Compare F.R.Cr.P. 8(a) with I.C.R. 
8(a). 
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This Court first acknowledged its recent decision in Grist, noting, "It reiterated 
that bad acts may only be admitted 'if relevant to prove ... a common scheme or plan 
embracing the commission of two or more crimes so related to each other that proof of 
one tends to establish the other, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or 
accident."' Id. at 668 (quoting Grist, 147 Idaho at 54-55) (emphasis in original). 
Summarizing its holding, this Court explained, "In other words, at a minimum, there 
must be evidence of a common scheme or plan beyond the bare fact that sexual 
misconduct has occurred with children in the past." Id. 
In allowing the evidence to be presented, the district court had found three 
characteristics that provided a link between the prior acts and the pending charges: "(1) 
both victims were about seven to eight years old; (2) both victims viewed Johnson as an 
'authority figure' because he was an older brother or father; [and] (3) both courses of 
conduct involved Johnson requesting the victim to touch his penis." Id. at 669. In 
finding admission of the prior acts improper, this Court explained, "These similarities, 
however, are sadly far too unremarkable to demonstrate a 'common scheme or plan' in 
Johnson's behavior. The facts that the two victims in this case are juvenile females and 
that Johnson is a family member are precisely what make these incidents unfortunately 
quite ordinary." Id. 
In State v. Joy, 155 Idaho 1 (2013), this Court summarized the rule it clarified in 
Grist and affirmed in Johnson as follows: 
[T]o be admissible under Rule 404(b ), evidence of prior misconduct must 
show more than a superficial similarity to the nature and details of the 
charged conduct, but must instead show that the defendant's charged and 
uncharged conduct is linked in a way that permits the inference that the 
prior conduct was planned as part of a course of conduct leading up to the 
charged offense. 
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Joy, 155 Idaho at 10 (emphasis added). 
No evidence was offered that the alleged abuse of J.B. in 2004 "was planned as 
part of a course of conduct leading up to" the alleged abuse of K.B. in 2011 and 2012. 
It would be illogical to conclude that the alleged abuse in 2004 of a different victim of a 
different age in a different manner and with a different relationship to Mr. Bower was 
perpetrated in order to commit the later alleged abuse in 2011 and 2012. See Field, 
144 Idaho at 566 ("There is nothing to show that at the time Field committed the offense 
against T.B. he had a plan to also commit an offense against H.P .... [or] against 
someone he would be 'babysitting' two years later"). 
Assuming that it is appropriate to go beyond the interpretation of the "common 
scheme or plan" language from Rule 8 provided by this Court in Field, or the similar 
interpretation of "common scheme or plan" for purposes of Idaho Rule of Evidence 
404(b) provided by this Court in Joy, the factual differences and the number of years 
between the conduct alleged in count two and that alleged in counts one and three 
make it clear that joinder was legally improper. Aside from the large amount of time 
between the incident involving J.B. and K.B. (seven to eight years), the difference in 
relationships between Mr. Bower and the alleged victims (K.B. is Mr. Bower's daughter, 
while J.B. is the daughter of Mr. Bower's former long-term girlfriend), and the difference 
in the conduct alleged (one proceeded to full-blown intercourse, while the other involved 
manual-to-genital contact), Mr. Bower notes that the age differences between the two 
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alleged victims, approximately three years, especially in light of the ages that they were, 
compels a finding that count two was improperly joined with counts one and three.4 
Regardless of whether it is the factual differences themselves or the lack of any 
evidence that the conduct alleged to have been committed against J.B. in 2004 was part 
of a plan to commit the charged offenses against K.B. in 2011 and 2012, the denial of 
Mr. Bower's motion to sever was erroneous. Mr. Bower maintains that, in light of the 
nature of the charges and the testimony given by both alleged victims, it will be 
impossible for the State to establish, beyond a reasonable doubt, that no prejudice 
occurred as a result of the improper joinder.5 As such, the only appropriate remedy is 
for this Court to vacate the judgment of conviction, and remand this matter for new, 
separate trials. 
4 One of the victims in this case, J.B., was 10 or 11 years old, whereas the more recent 
victim, K.B., was 13 or 14 years old. (R., p.20.) In short, one victim was a teenager, 
while the other was not. 
5 The prejudice inherent in this type of case, with charges involving multiple victims 
improperly joined, is summed up by a review of the transcript of a portion of the 
examination of one member of the jury panel in voir dire: 
Q. And so in a case like this, you wouldn't give Kyle a presumption of 
innocence? 
A. There's two victims? 
Q. Well, that's what they say. 
A. I'd have a hard time, yeah ... 
A. I'd just have a hard time believing somebody when two people 
made the same accusation. 
(Tr., p.232, L.14 - p.233, L.9.) 
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CONCLUSION 
Mr. Bower respectfully requests that this Court grant his Petition for Review. If 
granted, Mr. Bower respectfully requests that this Court vacate the judgment of 
conviction, and remand this matter for separate trials. 
DATED this 15111 day of April, 2015. 
ERIC D. FREDERICKSEN 
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
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